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man's moral being and the most important part of his soul. The nature of God, accordingly, would not be a mere private affair concerning which no one has a right to propound an opinion except quite privately for himself alone; but it would be the most important problem of life, the discussion of which could not and should not be avoided in the most important sciences, which are ethics, psychology, sociology, and also political economy. And this paramount importance of the religious problem, is the position which we have always maintained in all our publications, —in *The Open Court*, in *The Monist*, and in the books that have been brought out by The Open Court Publishing Company.

So long as a man's notion of God is simply an external acceptance of the traditional image of the Deity as it is represented in the symbolical books of the Church, he cannot distinguish between the essential and unessential, between the truth and the allegorical form in which the truth is represented. The existence of such a God cannot be demonstrated, he has simply to be postulated (to use the slang of Kantian philosophy). But after all, what a poor God is the God that must be postulated! For it matters little whether or not a being or a thing exists that lies without the pale of all possible experience.

How radical is the change as soon as we attempt to reduce our notion of God to terms of our life-experiences. Instead of starting with a postulate that never can be proved, we investigate facts and discern between the eternal and the transient; the immutable or everlasting, and the perishable or ever changing; the universal and the particular. The former is the divine, the latter characterises the phenomenal of the creation. The divine, as the law of being, becomes to sentient and aspiring creatures the norm of conduct, for it enforces obedience on penalty of perdition and constitutes the ultimate authority of morality. This is what we call the superpersonal God of the Religion of Science. Whether or not we choose to call this omnipresent reality "God," it is here in us as the most essential part of our experiences and it is also traceable in the world that surrounds us. It is immanent in the universe as the cosmic order of nature, and it is, at the same time, supernatural as the condition of any possible kind of world, for indeed we may imagine that other worlds consisting of some other material existed besides this actual world of ours, but it is impossible that there be any world in which the universal laws (such as are formulated in logic, arithmetic, and the other formal sciences) would have no application.

While we propose a solution of the religious problem that widely differs from the conciliation between religion and science as offered by Dr. Haacke, we heartily recommend his book to a friendly, albeit, at the same time, a critical perusal. P.C.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit. By Dr. Rudolf Steiner.
Weimar: Emil Felber. 1895. Pages, 125.

It is probable that Friedrich Nietzsche, in spite of his erratic and almost insane views, will come to the front in Germany and perhaps even in our country. The

school-philosophy at the various universities of the civilised world has become so self-satisfied and at the same time so barren that a revolution arising from the depths of the instinctive life of the people may be anticipated. Such a philosophy of revolution found an ingenious prophet in Friedrich Nietzsche, a man full of eccentricities, a hater of sound logic, a writer of incoherent thoughts, yet always interesting in his Corybantic frenzy, proud and full of contempt for professional philosophers whom he characterises as personified text-books on logic. However much we sympathise with the aspirations of an original thinker who wants to regenerate the sickly thought of his age, and however much we recommend the study of his ebullitions which are ingenious and amusing at the same time, we cannot prophesy for Nietzsche a lasting success, for his philosophy is self-destructive; it is a philosophy that repudiates clearness of thought and as such it is in itself impossible. In spite of his many affirmations Nietzsche is negative, for all his affirmations are a vigorous protest against the suppression of the various instincts of thought, including those which are illegitimate, because they would not submit to logic, truth, and morality. If Nietzsche really were victorious it would mean an intellectual disintegration of philosophy, science, and ethics.

Dr. Rudolf Steiner is a man who feels an intellectual kinship to Nietzsche. What Nietzsche said concerning Schopenhauer, Steiner applies to his own relation to Nietzsche. He says: "I belong to those readers of Nietzsche who, having read his first page, know for certain that they will read all the remaining pages and will listen to every word uttered by him. My confidence was at once established. I comprehended him as if he had written especially for me." The present booklet contains an almost complete characterisation of Nietzsche, with the exception of his biography, which ought not to have been omitted, especially as his sad death in a state of alienation is quite in harmony with his philosophy of life. We may add that Macmillan & Co. are going to publish a translation of Nietzsche's complete works.

Nietzsche is the philosopher of instinct. He spurns all logical order, even truth itself. He has a contempt for every one who learns from others, for he regards them as slaves to other people's thought. He says in his motto to the second edition of his "Gay Science":

"Ich wohne in meinem eignen Haus,
Hab' niemandem nie nichts nachgemacht
Und—lachte noch jeden Meister aus,
Der nicht sich selber ausgelacht."

"I live in my own house, have never imitated anybody, and ever laughed at every master, who does not laugh at himself."

We wonder that Nietzsche did not think of Goethe's little rhyme, which seems to suit his case exactly:

"A fellow says: 'I own no school or college;
No master lives whom I acknowledge;

And pray don't entertain the thought
 That from the dead I e'er learnt aught
 This, if I rightly understand,
 Means : 'I'm a fool by own command.'

Nietzsche is an individualist who observes that the thoughts of most philosophers are secretly guided by instincts. He feels that all thought is at bottom a "will for power." The will for truth has no right to exist except it serve the will for power. He reproaches philosophers for glorifying truth. When Fichte in his *Duties of the Scholar* says : "My life and my fate are nothing ; but the results of my life, are of great importance. I am a priest of Truth ; I am in the service of Truth ; I feel under obligation to do, to risk, and to suffer anything for Truth," Nietzsche declares that this is shallow. Will for truth, he says, should be called 'will to make being thinkable.' Here, it seems to us, Nietzsche simply replaces the word "truth" by its definition. For what is truth but a systematic representation of reality, a comprehensive description of facts ; truth is "being made thinkable." Nietzsche is perfectly right when he says that truth in itself is nothing, for every representation of reality must serve a purpose, otherwise it is superfluous and useless. And the purpose of truth is the furtherance of life. Nietzsche instinctively hits the right thing in saying that at the bottom of philosophy there is the will for power. In spite of our school-philosophers' vain declamations of "science for its own sake," genuine philosophy will never be anything else than a method for the acquisition of power. But this method is truth. Since the scholars' specialised business is the elucidation of the method, not its purpose, not its application in practical life, Fichte's ideal of the aim of scholarship remains justified.

The will for power, in order to succeed, must be clarified. The contradictory impulses must be systematised so that they would not mutually annihilate themselves ; and the comprehension of this orderly disposition is called reason.

However ingenious the idea of a super-man, as pronounced by Nietzsche, may be, and however cleverly the new word is coined, Nietzsche carries his propositions to such extremes that in spite of many flashes of truth they become in the end ridiculous and even absurd. Nietzsche is on the right track when he ridicules such ideals as "virtue for the sake of virtue," and even "truth for the sake of truth." Virtue and truth are for the sake of life. They have not their purpose in themselves but their nature consists in serving the expanse and further growth of the human soul. This is a truth which we have always insisted upon and which becomes apparent when those people who speak of virtue for its own sake try to define virtue, or determine the ultimate standard of right and wrong, of goodness and badness. We say, that that which enhances soul-growth, thus producing higher life and begetting the super-man is good ; while that which cripples or retards those aspirations is bad. Further, truth is not holy in itself. It becomes holy in the measure that it serves man's holiest aspirations. We sometimes meet among scientists, and especially among philologists, men who with the ideal of "truth for the

sake of truth " pursue some trivial investigations. They resemble Wagner, whom Faust characterises as :

" . . . a fool whose choice is
To stick in shallow trash for ever more,
Who digs with eager hand for buried ore,
And when he finds an earthworm he rejoices."

Thus there are many trivial truths which are indifferent and the investigation of which is of no account. For instance, whether the correct pronunciation of the Greek letter η was *ee* or *ay* need not concern us much, and the philologist who devotes to its settlement all his life and his best strength is rather to be pitied than admired. Various truths are very different in value, for life and truth become holy according to their importance. This all granted, we need not, however, discard truth, reason, virtue and all moral aspirations as does Nietzsche, who in his super-man says : " What is the greatest that you can experience ? It is the hour of the great contempt, the hour in which you become disgusted with your happiness and at the same time with your reason and your virtue."

Nietzsche apparently is under the illusion that reason, systematic thought, the moral discipline, self-control, are external powers, and in his love of liberty he objects to their authority. Did he ever consider that thought is not an external agent, but a clarification of man's instincts, and that discipline is, or at least in its purpose and final aim ought to be, self-regulation, so that our contradictory thoughts would not wage an internecine war. Thus Nietzsche, the instinct philosopher, appears as an ingenious boy whose very immaturity is regarded by himself as the highest blossom of his existence. Like an intoxicated youth, he revels in his irresponsibility and laughs at the man who has learned to take life seriously. Because the love of truth originates from instincts, Nietzsche treats it as a mere instinct, and nothing else. He forgets that in the evolution of man's soul, all instincts develop into something higher than instinct and the love of truth develops into systematic science. He never investigates what his self consists of. He never analyses his individuality. Otherwise he would have learned that he has received the most valuable part of his being from others and that that bundle of instincts which he calls his sovereign self is nothing but the inherited heirloom of the ages that have preceded him. In spite of his repudiation of owing anything to others, he is but the continuation of others. But he boldly carries his individualism, if not to its logical conclusions, yet to its moral applications. When speaking of the Order of Assassins of the times of the Crusades, he says with enthusiasm : " The highest secrecy of their leaders was, ' Nothing is true, everything is allowed ! ' " And Nietzsche adds : " Indeed that was liberty of spirit, that dismissed even the belief in truth." The philosopher of instinct regards even the adhesion to truth as slavery and the proclamation of truth as dogmatism.

Nietzsche's influence is increasing in Germany, as may be learned from the appearance of a weekly journal, *Der Eigene*, which promises to be an exponent of his

modes of thought. It announces itself as "a journal for all and nobody," and "sounds the slogan for all egoists" calling on them to preserve their ownhood. It proposes to antagonise all ideals of the brotherhood of man in the religious, ethical, altruistic, social, and communistic fields. It decries monopoly in every form, wages war against all democratic programmes, all aspirations of equality, including charity-maniacs in every form and slumming (*Pöbelbeglückung*); it antagonises bureaucracy and all rules. It does not expect social salvation from the socialistic abolition of private property, but from an unimpeded personal appropriation, the realisation of which appears in a free market and the unconditional *laissez faire, laissez passer*. It expects to attain liberty by strengthening the single individual, which is to build up egotistical communities. It repudiates the plan of revolutionising the masses, and the use of violence. It stands up for the pathfinders in literature and art, for personality, for that which is characteristic. However interesting one single thinker may be who defends eccentricity as a principle, we are sure that a whole school of the same type would soon become tiresome. It is quite an entertainment to read Nietzsche, his followers are simply bores. A mode of thought the sole merits of which consist in its originality, loses all value when reproduced in imitations.

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KONNTE JESUS IRREN? Unter dem geschichtlichen, dogmatischen und psychologischen Gesichtspunkte principiell beantwortet. By Dr. Paul Schwartzkopff. Giessen: J. Ricker'sche Buchhandlung. 1896.

The same author whose booklet on "the prophecies of Christ concerning his death, resurrection, and second advent," we discussed in the last number of *The Monist*, has worked out another booklet on a problem which is closely connected with his former work and keeps in harmony with the whole plan of a greater work on "God's revelation in Jesus Christ according to its content, extent, and limits," and Professor Schwartzkopff has the happy disposition of hitting the problem which is the most salient of all, and which when solved will elucidate a number of minor problems. Most theologians are busy with minor problems, and do not consider that their solution is of little account so long as those great central problems remain unsolved. The investigation of Christ's prophecies concerning his own second advent lead Professor Schwartzkopff deeper into the fundamental question, Could Christ err?

If we are led to the conclusion that Christ actually did err, our author asks, must we not surrender Christianity, and does not Christ cease to be the God-man in whom God's revelation appeared in its highest and most perfect fulfilment. Professor Schwartzkopff denies these questions with great decision, for he claims that Jesus was not only truly God but also truly man; and his liability to error is one of the most important consequences of his human nature. The problem for a Christian, he claims, is to determine the limits within which Jesus was liable to err.

Although a Christian of outspoken Christian convictions, Schwartzkopff takes